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Abstract. Because of the conceptual difficulties it faces, quantum mechan-
ics provides a salient example of how alternative metaphysical commitments
may clarify our understanding of a physical theory and the explanations it
provides. Here we will consider how postulating alternative quantum worlds
in the context of Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics may serve to explain
determinate measurement records and the standard quantum statistics. We
will focus here on the properties of such worlds, then briefly consider other
metaphysical options available for interpreting pure wave mechanics. These
reflections will serve to illustrate both the nature and the limits of naturalized
metaphysics.
1. introduction
There is good reason to suppose that naturalized metaphysics should not in-
volve trying to read a canonical metaphysics off our best physical theories. Since
our theories are provisional, since different theories suggest different metaphysical
commitments, and since even a particular theoretical framework may allow for radi-
cally different metaphysical variants, our best physics cannot be expected to provide
anything like a canonical specification of one’s proper metaphysical commitments.
Naturalized metaphysics, rather, involves balancing our pre-theoretic explana-
tory demands against the alternative understandings of the world suggested by our
best theories. On this view, the metaphysician explores alternative ways of taking
our best theories to be descriptive then evaluates the explanatory tradeoffs between
these alternatives. The aim is to provide a clear and honest map of the options and
a careful cost-benefit analysis. Of course, the metaphysical stories one tells along
the way are at least as provisional as the theoretical frameworks themselves.
Metaphysics here is in the service of clarity and the careful evaluation of al-
ternative explanatory options. It aims to provide a clearer understanding of our
best theories and sharpen how we use them. Indeed, insofar as one individuates
theories by the explanations they give, since a particular theoretical framework
will typically provide different explanations in the context of different background
metaphysical commitments, alternative metaphysical commitments yield alterna-
tive physical theories. One is only clear about the descriptive content of particular
theory when one is clear about how it provides explanations, and one is only clear
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about that when one is clear about the role played by one’s metaphysics in those
explanations. By characterizing how it describes and explains, the metaphysics we
associate with a physical theory becomes a part of the theory. Naturalized meta-
physics is constructive. It is a piece with the clear specification and individuation
of our theories.
Explanations that appeal to metaphysical commitments often take the form of
descriptive stories. Such stories may say why an event occurs, or why it should be
expected, or how it is physically possible. Richer explanatory stories may charac-
terize mechanisms, describe how events are caused, or account for the existence of
entities of a particular sort or some aspect of the structure of the world described
by the theory. It is in this way that our metaphysical commitments are in service
of our best understanding of the physical world and the explanations that go with
it.
Quantum mechanics provides examples of how alternative metaphysical commit-
ments may help to pin down quite different ways of describing the physical world.
This case is of particular philosophical interest since the commitments involved in
making sense of alternative formulations of quantum mechanics are often strongly
counterintuitive and, hence, instructive concerning both the nature of the world
and the limits of philosophical intuition.
The task of interpreting Everett’s (1955, 1956, 1957) pure wave mechanics pro-
vides an example of how metaphysical commitments may serve in our understanding
of quantum mechanics. This example will also illustrate how metaphysical com-
mitments contribute to the descriptive content of a theory. There is a sense in
which the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics, Ev-
erett’s pure wave mechanics, his relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics,
the many-worlds interpretation, Bohm’s theory, and GRW are all just formulations
of quantum mechanics.1 But insofar as they provide radically different explanations
for our experience, they are well-understood as different physical theories individ-
uated, in part, by the metaphysics one finds appropriate to associate with each.2
Here we will briefly consider the relationships between the standard collapse theory,
pure wave mechanics, many worlds, and relative states.
1See Albert (1992) and Barrett (1999) for introductions to these and other formulations of quantum
mechanics.
2As suggested earlier, a single theoretical framework may be associated with quite different sets
of metaphysical commitments. Bohmian mechanics, for example, may be thought of as a theory
about events in ordinary three-dimensional space (as David Bohm himself suggested), or as a
theory about events in a high-dimensional configuration space (as John Bell and David Albert
have suggested), or as a many-worlds theory (as characterized by something like the many-threads
formulation of quantum mechanics). See Barrett (1999) for discussions of these and other options.
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2. quantum mechanics
A compelling case can be made that our two best physical theories are quantum
mechanics and special relativity. Indeed, in many ways they are the most success-
ful empirical theories we have ever had. They not only correctly predict a broad
range of counterintuitive phenomena, but they do so with remarkable precision.
In some cases the two theories, working together, make the right empirical predic-
tions to better than twelve significant figures. It is remarkable that we can make
measurements that precisely. That we have theories that make the right empirical
predictions to that precision is almost unbelievable, especially when we know that
at least one of the two theories, quantum mechanics, cannot be true.
The problem is not that the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation quantum
mechanics is counterintuitive. It is, but it must be to make the right empirical
predictions. The problem, rather, is that the theory is logically inconsistent on a
strict reading and empirically incomplete on even the most charitable reading.
Further, the standard formulation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with
relativistic constraints in two fundamental ways. As Einstein argued in 1927, both
the essential use of 3N -dimensional configuration space to represent the states of
spacelike separated systems, and the dynamical laws of the standard collapse for-
mulation presuppose an absolute standard of simultaneity, which is incompatible
with the constraints of relativity, at least as Einstein himself understood them.3
Addressing the quantum measurement problem, then, involves coming up with a
formulation of quantum mechanics that can be understood as providing a complete
and consistent description of quantum systems while at the same time finding some
sort of reconciliation between quantum mechanics and special relativity.
Hugh Everett III proposed a solution to the measurement problem that he called
pure wave mechanics. The theoretical framework he described is manifestly logically
consistent and is arguably compatible with relativistic constraints. The problem is
that it is unclear how it explains our experience. It is not that the theory makes the
wrong empirical predictions; rather, it is unclear that it predicts anything at all for
the sort of experiments we routinely perform, and, if it does, it is unclear precisely
what. Explaining our quantum experience involves explaining why observers end up
with determinate measurement records at the end of their measurement interactions
and explaining why such records should be expected to exhibit the characteristic
quantum statistics. And pure wave mechanics alone accomplishes neither of these
explanatory tasks.
3Einstein expressed his view that both (1) the essential use of configuration space to explain and
predict the behavior of spacelike separated entangled systems and (2) the collapse of the state
on measurement implied “a contradiction with the postulate of relativity” (Instituts Solvay 1928,
256).
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That said, one can get a start on accounting for determinate measurement
records and their statistical properties by adding appropriate metaphysical assump-
tions to pure wave mechanics. Of course, the explanations one gets depend on the
metaphysics one adds.
On his earliest formulation of the theory, Everett appealed to cross-sections and
branches to explain determinate measurement records and their properties.4 Given
the explanatory role he seemed to have in mind for them, one might understand
the branches represented in a cross-section of the total state as alternative quantum
worlds.5 But if one does understand branches as worlds, then they are not much
like the sort of alternative possible worlds that philosophers typically consider.6
In particular, to mesh with Everett’s explanations, alternative quantum worlds
have the following properties: (i) they explain our having determinate measurement
records and why these records exhibit the standard quantum statistics, (ii) they
are all equally actual, (iii) they may always, at least in principle, interact with each
other and, hence, may be detectable, (iv) they are physically emergent in the sense
that what quantum worlds there are at a time depends on the total quantum state
of the physical world, and (v) they are conventional in the sense that the precise
set of alternative quantum worlds that there are depends on what cross-section of
the total state one chooses to consider.
Here we will consider how Everett understood these properties and why. We will
start by considering the quantum measurement problem and Everett’s proposal
for solving it in more detail, paying particular attention to the explanatory role
that branches, or quantum worlds, might play. We will then briefly consider the
corresponding story in the context of an alternative metaphysical option suggested
by his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics.
3. the standard theory and the measurement problem
Everett proposed pure wave mechanics as a graduate student at Princeton in
the years just prior to 1957. At this time, there were two standard options for
formulating quantum mechanics, the von Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation and
Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation, and a small handful of non-standard alterna-
tives, like Bohmian mechanics, that were taken seriously then by very few. Everett
4As indicated in his notes and the short pre-dissertation papers he wrote for his advisor John
Wheeler.
5See Barrett (2011b) for a discussion of Everett’s reluctance to refer to quantum worlds in his
presentation of this theory.
6As indicated by his being one of the first people to read Everett’s deposited thesis, David Lewis
was very much interested in Everett’s formulation of quantum mechanics (Lewis checked the
original thesis out from the Princeton library on 25 January 1966). But, as Lewis reported when
he and I discussed this in the mid 1990’s, he quickly concluded that Everett possible worlds were
quite different from his own, and he did not see any immediate implication of one notion for the
other. See Barrett and Byrne (2012, 174) for a list of early readers of Everett’s original thesis.
QUANTUM WORLDS 5
used the von Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation of quantum mechanics to set up
the measurement problem because he considered it to be the “more common” form
of quantum theory, at least in the U.S.7
Importantly, Everett took both the standard von Neumann-Dirac collapse formu-
lation of quantum mechanics and Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation to encounter a
similar, fatal conceptual problem. Neither could satisfactorily address nested mea-
surements of the sort one finds in the Wigner’s Friend Story. Everett used the von
Neumann-Dirac collapse theory to tell his version of the Wigner’s Friend Story,
to explain how he understood the measurement problem, and to characterize his
solution to the problem.
In the long version of his thesis, Everett appealed to each of the following prin-
ciples of the von Neumann (1955) formulation of quantum mechanics to set up the
problem of nested measurements:
• Representation of States: The state of a physical system S is represented
by a vector ψS of unit length in a Hilbert space H.
• Representation of Observables: A physical observable O is represented
by a set of orthogonal vectors O. These vectors represent the eigenstates
of the observable, each corresponding to a different value.
• Interpretation of States: A system S has a determinate value for ob-
servable O if and only if ψS ∈ O.
• Dynamical Laws:
I. Linear dynamics: If no measurement is made, the system S evolves in
a deterministic linear way: ψ(t1)S = Uˆ(t0, t1)ψ(t0)S .
II. Nonlinear collapse dynamics: If a measurement is made, the system
S randomly, instantaneously, and nonlinearly jumps to an eigenstate of the
observable being measured: the probability of jumping to φS when O is
measured is |ψφ|2.
The problem, Everett argued, is that this theory is logically inconsistent and
hence untenable. He examined what he called the question of the consistency of the
standard theory in the context of an “amusing, but extremely hypothetical drama”
(1956, 74–5). The story he told was Everett’s original version of what has come
to be known as the Wigner’s Friend story after Eugene Wigner (1961) famously
told it again some years later to support a formulation of quantum mechanics very
different from Everett’s.8 For his part, Everett appealed to the story to argue that
7See Everett’s letter to Aage Petersen 31 May 1957 (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 238–40).
8Everett’s proposal for solving the problem was to drop dynamical law (II) from the theory.
In contrast, Wigner’s solution was to stipulate that law (II) kicked in when a conscious entity
apprehended the physical state of the object system.
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there is a contradiction between the two dynamical laws presented in the standard
collapse formation of quantum mechanics.
W
r
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x-spin
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Using Wigner’s terminology, Everett’s story involved a friend F in a state |“r”〉F
ready to observe his measuring device and a measuring device M in a state |“r”〉M
ready to to measure a property of a system S. We will suppose that S is spin-1/2
system, that the property being measured is x-spin, and that the system S begins
in the state
(1) 1/
√
2(|↑x〉S + |↓x〉S).
Assuming ideal correlating interactions between the systems, the linear dynamics
(I) predicts that the composite system F +M + S will be in the state
(2) 1/
√
2(|“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M |↑x〉S + |“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S).
after the measuring device M interacts with the object system S and after the
friend F interacts with the pointer on the M . The standard interpretation of
states, however, tells us that this is a state where the friend has no determinate
measurement record at all. Indeed, he is in an entangled state with M and S here
and hence does not even have a proper quantum-mechanical state of his own.
In contrast, if we use the nonlinear collapse dynamics (II) for the interaction
between M and S or for the interaction between M and F , the composite system
F +M + S will either be in the state
(3) |“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M |↑x〉S
or in the state
(4) |“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S ,
each, in this case, with equal probability 1/2. Unlike state (2), each of these states
describes the friend F as having a perfectly determinate measurement record on the
standard interpretation of states. Specifically, in the first F determinately records
the result “↑x” and in the second he determinately records the result “↓x.”
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The contradiction between dynamical laws (I) and (II) is represented in the fact
that they predict incompatible states when applied to the same interaction. If one
knew precisely when to apply each law, one might avoid the contradiction, but since
measurement is a primitive term in the theory, the standard formulation of quantum
mechanics provides no guidance for when to use dynamical law (I) and when to use
dynamical law (II). Everett, consequently, took the theory to be inconsistent and
hence untenable. A more charitable assessment would have been that the theory
is at best incomplete since it does not clearly indicate which law to use, and it is
logically inconsistent if one insists that measuring devices are physical systems like
any other. But, then again, why shouldn’t they be given that they are composed
of ordinary physical systems interacting linearly.
For his part, Everett believed that sentient observers and measuring devices were
indeed properly modeled as physical systems like any other. Hence, he believed that,
were such an experiment ever performed, the composite system system F +M +S
would end up, as required by the linear dynamics, in a state like (2). Further, he
believed that an external observer W might, in principle, measure an observable of
the composite system F +M +S that has (2) as an eigenstate with eigenvalue +1,
say, and every state orthogonal to (2) as an eigenstate with eigenvalue −1 and that
one would with certainty get the result +1, which would indicate that F +M + S
was in fact in state (2).
What makes the drama “extremely hypothetical” is that, in practice, quantum
decoherence effects would make it extremely difficult for W to make such a mea-
surement on a macroscopic system like F + M + S. Nevertheless, Everett held
(1) that one only has a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics if one can
provide a consistent account of such nested measurements like the one described in
the Wigner’s Friend story and (2) that, if such a measurement were ever made, one
would find that there was no collapse of F ’s state, M ’s state, or the state of the
object system S when they interacted with each other.
So to solve the quantum measurement problem as Everett himself understood
it, one must be able to tell the Wigner’s Friend story consistently. And Everett re-
peatedly described how the story must go on his view. His proposal for solving the
measurement problem was to take pure wave mechanics, the von Neumann-Dirac
theory but without the collapse dynamics (II), to provide a complete and accurate
description of all physical interactions whatsoever. And his goal was to show that
when observers are themselves modeled as physical systems, pure wave mechan-
ics can be understood as making the same empirical predictions as the standard
collapse theory (whenever the latter makes coherent empirical predictions).
In some sense pure wave mechanics does indeed immediately solve the mea-
surement problem. With only one dynamical law, there is no threat of inconsistent
8 JEFFREY A. BARRETT
state predictions nor any puzzle about what dynamics to apply and when. But pure
wave mechanics also leads to two new problems: the determinate record problem
involves explaining how measurements generate determinate measurement records
and the probability problem involves explaining why measurement outcomes should
be expected to exhibit the standard quantum probabilities. Postulating branches,
or quantum worlds, is meant to explain both determinate records and quantum
probabilities.
4. elements, branches, and quantum worlds
Let’s start by considering how pure wave mechanics models an observer in the
context of a measurement interaction. Consider the Wigner’s Friend experiment
just discussed, but starting with a more general initial state
(5) α|↑x〉S + β|↓x〉S .
Assuming perfect correlating interactions, by the linear dynamics, the resultant
state will then be
(6) α|“↑x”〉F |“↑x”〉M |↑x〉S + β|“↓x”〉F |“↓x”〉M |↓x〉S .
When an experiment like this is in fact performed, the observer gets either the
result “↑x” or the result “↓x” with probabilities |α|2 and |β|2 respectively. But the
state (6) does not describe an observer with any particular measurement result.
And since the evolution of the state is deterministic and since there is no epistemic
uncertainty in its evolution, it is unclear how to understand the standard quantum
probabilities. Everett recognized both of these problems.
In his earliest account of determinate records, Everett appealed to cross sections
(1955, 66–8) and branches (1955, 68–9). He argued that, while the observer does
not have any particular determinate record, there are “cross sections of the total
wave function” in which each term or element in the superposition describes the
observer with a definite measurement record that is correlated with a definite state
of the object system. Everett used the term cross section to refer to a particular
decomposition of the total state in terms of a selected orthonormal basis. Here (6)
provides one cross section of the total state. Writing the same state in another
basis would provide a different cross section.
Everett held that the existence of such cross sections explains both determinate
measurement outcomes and the standard quantum statistics. In particular, one
can find the determinate measurement records one gets in a branch represented
by the terms in a cross section like that provided by (6). In this case, the first
term represents a branch where F records the result “↑x” and in the second term
represents a branch where F records the result “↓x.” If one thinks of each of these
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branches as representing a quantum world, then F gets perfectly determinate, but
different records, in each world. The addition of this bit of metaphysics, then, ex-
plains why it will appear to a particular F that he gets a determinate measurement
result. As Everett put it in conversation with Abner Shimony in 1962, “Each in-
dividual branch looks like a perfectly respectable world where definite things have
happened” (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 275–6).
Concerning the standard quantum statistics, Everett proceeded to argue that if
an observer like F were to perform a series of measurements, the records of the
results in a typical branch would exhibit the standard quantum statistics, in a spe-
cial sense of typical that Everett specified. It is important to note that, while the
typicality measure that Everett specified satisfies the axioms of a probability mea-
sure, he explicitly denied that it in any way represented probabilities. This point
was sufficiently central to his project that he originally titled his thesis “Quantum
Mechanics without Probability” (Barrett and Byrne 2012, 72). Everett’s strategy,
then, was to use his notion of typicality to explain the standard quantum statistics
but without an appeal to probabilities.
In brief, this worked as follows.9 Everett argued that if one performs a sequence
of measurements, the sequence of records in a typical branch (or quantum world),
in the norm-squared amplitude measure sense of typical, will exhibit the standard
quantum statistics. It is not that most determinate-record branches, in the counting
sense of most, will exhibit the standard quantum statistics. Rather, it is that the
greatest weight of branches will exhibit the standard quantum statistics when one
weights each branch by the square of the coefficient associated with it.10
It is in this way that Everett found the standard quantum statistics in a typical
quantum world without there being any quantum probabilities. As a consequence,
if one supposes that one’s own world is typical in the sense that Everett described,
this stipulation would explain why one’s experimental results exhibit the standard
quantum statistics. But for the theory to predict that one should expect that one’s
world is likely typical in this sense would require one to add something else to
the theory that ties Everett’s typicality measure to one’s expectations. Everett
never did that. He seems to have thought it was unnecessary given his modest
explanatory goals.
Not only did Everett never explain why one should expect that the branch rep-
resenting one’s experience should be typical, it is unclear how such expectations
might be made compatible with his insistence that there were no probabilities in
9See, for example, Everett (1957,188-94).
10In this measure, for example, the branches represented by the elements in the superposition (6)
after a a single measurement get assigned weights |α|2 and |β|2 respectively.
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the theory.11 That said, he did show how one can find the experiences of an ob-
server as typical, in his specified sense, in the model of pure wave mechanics. And
he explicitly took that to be enough.
Everett held that his theory was empirically faithful.12 Empirical faithfulness
might be thought of as a weak sort of empirical adequacy. In some ways, it is
akin to empirical adequacy on Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism
as it consists in finding an observer’s experience associated with the observer as
represented in the model of the theory. Inasmuch it was empirically faithful, Everett
took pure wave mechanics to be empirically acceptable. And since it was also
logically consistent and simple, indeed, arguably the simplest possible formulation
of quantum mechanics, he took pure wave mechanics to be clearly better than other
options for addressing the quantum measurement problem.
5. The properties of quantum worlds
We are now in a position to discuss the properties of branches, or quantum
worlds, as Everett understood them. To begin, the point of postulating quantum
worlds is to explain why we get a determinate measurement records and why such
records exhibit the standard quantum statistics.
Since the linear dynamical describes all physical interactions in pure wave me-
chanics, the total quantum state does not typically describe an observer as getting
any particular measurement record. But a particular measurement record can be
found in each quantum world on an appropriately selected cross section of the
total state. So, if one imagines that an observer inhabits a particular such quan-
tum world, then one has an explanation for why the observer sees a particular
measurement result. Similarly, the standard quantum statistics are descriptive of
determinate sequences of measurement records if the quantum world is typical in
Everett sense. So, if one identifies branches with quantum worlds and if one sup-
poses that one’s own world is typical in Everett’s sense, then one has an explanation
for one’s determinate measurement records and their statistical properties.
Still identifying branches with worlds, each quantum world is equally actual.
But, importantly, for Everett this was not a matter of metaphysical stipulation.
Rather, it was true by dint of the empirical consequences of the linear dynamics.
As he explained, “It is . . . improper to attribute any less validity or ‘reality’ to
any element of a superposition than any other element, due to [the] ever present
possibility of obtaining interference effects between the elements, all elements of
11Since there are quantum worlds where the quantum statistics are satisfied and others where
they are not, one should only expect one’s own world to exhibit the standard quantum statistics
if one takes it to be probable for one to inhabit such a world, but Everett repeatedly denied that
the theory involved probabilities.
12See Barrett (2011) for a discussion of Everett’s notion of empirical faithfulness.
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a superposition must be regarded as simultaneously existing” (1956, 150). Each
element, branch, or quantum world, then, is real because it might, in principle, be
detected by a subtle enough interference experiment of the sort that Wigner W
might do to detect that the friend F , his measuring device M , and object system
S are in fact in the entangled superposition of determinate record states predicted
by the linear dynamics.13
Note that this account of determinate measurement records does not rely on
decoherence considerations. Not only did Everett not need decoherence effects to
explain determinate measurement outcomes, he described the goal of his project as
providing a clear and consistent account of nested measurement in the context of a
story where where he stipulated that there were no decoherence effects. Indeed, he
called the version of the Wigner’s Friend nested-measurement story that he told “an
extremely hypothetical drama” precisely because he was insisting on the implausible
condition that there are no interactions with the environment that might prevent
the external observer from determining the state of the internal F +M + S.14
The Wigner’s Friend story was a litmus test for Everett for whether one had
a satisfactorily account of nested measurement and hence could address the mea-
surement problem. Not only did he insist that one be able to tell the Wigner’s
Friend story consistently, he was also clear regarding how it must go. An external
observer would in principle be able to show empirically that the Friend recorded a
superposition of different results. Alternative quantum worlds on this view are real
not as causally separate worlds but as potentially detectable features of our world.
Quantum worlds, hence, are always in principle detectable.
Further, quantum worlds are emergent in the sense that what worlds there are
on a particular cross-section at a time depends on the evolution of the total quan-
tum state of the physical world. Such worlds come and go as the elements in the
superposition written in a particular basis or cross-section changes as the total state
evolves in accord with the linear dynamics.15
Finally, quantum worlds are conventional in the sense that what worlds there
are depends on what basis or cross-section of the global state one considers. If one
13See Albert (1986) for a short story of how Everett worlds might interact and Albert and Barrett
(1995) for why this consequently involves a very weak notion of what it takes to be a world.
14Everett’s position here is quite different for that of current Everettians who use decoherence
considerations to roughly individuate quantum worlds and hence explain determinate measure-
ment outcomes. See Saunders, Barrett, Kent and Wallace (eds) (2010) for a number of papers
that take the decoherence line and Wallace (2012) for a particularly well-developed example. Of
course, this does not mean that decoherence considerations can have no role at all in the theory.
For one thing, they help to explain why macroscopic measurement records can be expected to be
stable. The sort of interference interaction that would erase a macroscopic record would be as
difficult to perform as the Wigner’s Friend interference measurement.
15Here we are setting aside the problem of how to identify the same quantum world at different
times.
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wants an account of determinate measurement records, it is natural to choose a
basis that makes measurement records determinate in each branch of the superpo-
sition. But one could choose a basis that does not do that, and Everett would still
insist that each branch in the alternative corresponding decomposition of the full
state was equally actual due to the ever present possibility of obtaining interference
effects between different branches. Further, even if one does choose a basis that
makes one’s measurement records determinate, one must also choose a level of de-
scriptive detail for the records, and different levels of descriptive detail will typically
involve different bases and, hence, characterize different sets of alternative quantum
worlds.16
6. Relative states, typicality, and expectations
For his part, Everett never referred to quantum worlds in any of his published
work. Rather, he called his theory the relative-state formulation of quantum me-
chanics, appealing to relative states rather than worlds to explain determinate
measurement outcomes and their statistics.
In both the long and short versions of his Ph.D. thesis, Everett appealed to the
distinction between absolute states and relative states to explain experience.
There does not, in general, exist anything like a single state for
one subsystem of a composite system. Subsystems do not possess
states that are independent of the states of the remainder of the
system, so that the subsystem states are generally correlated with
one another. One can arbitrarily choose a state for one subsystem,
and be led to the relative state for the remainder. Thus we are
faced with a fundamental relativity of states, which is implied by
the formalism of composite systems. It is meaningless to ask the
absolute state of a subsystem—one can only ask the state relative to
a given state of the remainder of the subsystem. (1956, 103; 1957,
180)
It was by supplementing pure wave mechanics with this distinction between absolute
and relative states that he got to his relative-state formulation.
On the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics, facts regarding the
properties of a subsystem of a composite system are relative to specifications of a
state for the compliment of that subsystem. The post-measurement observer F de-
scribed by the absolute state (6) has no determinate absolute measurement record
but does have determinate relative measurement records—relative to specifications
16That there is no canonical way to individuate quantum worlds has led even Everettians who
rely on decoherence to individuate worlds to insist that there is no matter of fact about how many
quantum worlds there are at a time. See, for example, Wallace (2012).
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of the state of his object system S. In particular, F has the determinate measure-
ment record “↑x” relative to S being in state | ↑x〉S and F has the determinate
measurement record “↓x” relative to S being in state |↓x〉S .
One way to characterize a metaphysics that meshes well with how Everett de-
scribed his theory would be to affirm that there is just one physical world but in-
sist that the facts concerning physical systems and observers, including observers’
records, are essentially relational. Along these lines, one might say that the observer
F has a perfectly determinate outcome to his measurement—it is just that what it
is is relative to a particular specification of the x-spin of system S. Branches on this
view might be thought of as representing a new indexical akin to time. Following
up on a suggestion that Simon Saunders (1995, 1996a, 1996b) made some years ago,
Christina Conroy (2010, 2012, 2015) has described how the metaphysics of such a
proposal might work in considerable detail.
The point for us here, however, is that, insofar as one individuates theories by
the explanations they provide, Everett’s relative-state formulation of pure wave
mechanics, just like the many-worlds formulation described above, is more than
pure wave mechanics. Specifically, insofar as the distinction between absolute and
relative states is essential to Everett’s explanation of experience, the distinction
and the explanatory role it plays is a part of Everett’s theory.
Moreover, explaining the standard quantum statistics, just as above, requires
yet further additions to the relative-state theory. Specifically, Everett’s particu-
lar notion of typicality must be added to the theory to get the conclusion that a
typical relative sequence of measurement records will exhibit the standard quan-
tum statistics as the number of measurements gets large. Whether one is talking
about alternative quantum worlds or relative states, there are an infinite number of
probability measures that one might consider using as a typicality measure. Hence,
one must add something to pure wave mechanics to characterize both what one
means by typical and how that particular notion of typical is supposed to provide
explanations for what we observe. And, if one wants to explain why one should
expect one’s relative records to exhibit the standard quantum statistics, one must
add something further still.
An upshot is that, whether one favors a many-worlds or a relative-state version
of the theory, there remain a number of problems interpreting Everett’s theory.
Among these is the fact that on one hand he set out to explain how one might un-
derstand pure wave mechanics as making precisely the same empirical predictions
as the standard collapse theory, which presumably involves making probabilistic
predictions, while, on the other hand, he clearly insisted that there were no prob-
abilities in his theory. So there is significant work remaining to do. But, as one
reconstructs the theory, one has metaphysical options, and what one chooses will
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determine how one one’s explanations go and hence how one ultimately understands
the theory.
7. Conclusion
Pure wave mechanics provides a basic mathematical framework and a partial
physical interpretation of the framework, but it does not, by itself, explain physical
phenomena. To be sure, the framework constrains one’s explanations, but it does
not determine them. To get satisfactory explanations one must supplement the
theory with metaphysical commitments that fit as neatly as possible both with the
theoretical framework and one’s explanatory demands. This involves negotiating
between the framework and one’s explanatory demands, and each side may well re-
quire tuning along the way. Consequently, the resulting metaphysical commitments
are contingent on the details of the particular explanatory demands and how one
sets about satisfying them.
In the present case, we have considered how quantum worlds and relative states
may be used to clarify our understanding of pure wave mechanics and supplement
the theoretical framework with what it needs to provide compelling explanations.
Specifically, we have considered how quantum worlds and relative states might be
characterized in a way that meshes well with Everett’s talk of branches and how such
worlds and states might help to provide explanations of determinate measurement
records and the standard quantum statistics.
Starting with a theory as simple as pure wave mechanics, one would naturally
like to claim that nothing at all needs to be added to get the standard quantum
predictions. But such a claim cannot be honestly made. Insofar as one individuates
theories by the explanations they provide, even Everett added a number of essential
notions and assumptions to get the very modest sort of explanations he sought.
This included adding distinctions like that between relative and absolute states
and a typicality measure and providing concrete examples of how to appeal to such
notions for explanations of quantum phenomena. And, if one wanted a theory
that predicted the standard quantum probabilities, one would need to add yet more
to pure wave mechanics, arguably assumptions that would be incompatible with
Everett’s project as he understood it.
Insofar as alternative quantum worlds are neither sharply individuated nor canon-
ical, the explanations one gets for determinate records and quantum statistics by
appealing to records in alternative worlds is correspondingly modest. Further, as
we have seen, there are other metaphysical options for providing such explanations.
Everett himself accounted for determinate records and how they are distributed by
appealing to the relative records. Such explanations are no stronger than what one
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gets with the sort of quantum worlds we have characterized here, but they suggest
a rather different set of metaphysical commitments.
Whatever option one ultimately favors in making sense of pure wave mechan-
ics, there are other quantum-mechanical frameworks that suggest quite different
metaphysical commitments. Examples can be seen in accounts like those provided
by particular formulations of Bohmian mechanics and GRW. This, again, is why
the naturalized metaphysician does not seek to infer a canonical metaphysics from
quantum mechanics or any another physical theory. Rather, the aim is to make
clear the trade-offs involved in alternative explanatory options.17
17I would like to thank Christina Conroy for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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